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Abstract— This paper presents a perspective on some is-
sues related to safety in the context of autonomous surgical
robots. To meet the challenge of safety certification and bring
about acceptance of the technology by the public, we propose
principles for a design paradigm that goes in the direction of
safety by construction: design with certification in mind, clearly
distinguish the notion of safety from that of responsibility, view
the human component as scaffolding in the progressive transfer
of decision-making to the machine, preserve interpretability by
renouncing black-box approaches, leverage interpretability to
assign responsibility, and take corrective action only when the
semantic of the human-machine interface is violated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of medical robotics is currently engaged in
a revolutionary push toward autonomy. The technology is
intended to allow a physician to delegate progressively
larger components of the surgical workflow to a machine.
Eventually, the technology will result in a robot capable of
executing an entire procedure autonomously, possibly even
operating as part of a surgical team in the operating room.
This ambitious direction of research presents a set of chal-
lenges that go beyond the technical. In particular, acceptance
and adoption of the technology depends critically on the
ability to show that the robot is safe and that its deployment
leads to performance at least not inferior to what can be
achieved without it. The process of certification is intended
to offer such guarantees to the public.
The main unresolved issue is the lack of a precise oper-
ational definition of safety in the context of surgical robots,
and in particular in the context of autonomous surgical
robots. A first key requirement of a suitable definition is
that it would be applicable along all levels of autonomy, as
classified in [1]. Secondly, it would include more then the
mechanical and operational safety of the robot considered,
for example, in [2], [3]. Because a robot at autonomy level
4 is in fact practicing medicine, safety ought to include
the dimension of patient safety, which we have shown in
[4] to be an emergent systemic property and to require an
approach focused on system-wide dependencies and system
integration.
A framework that allows for safety validation in such a
wide variety of circumstances is a necessary step for surgical
robots to overcome the hurdle of regulations and avoid
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rejection by the public as they reach market. Without both
the reality and the acknowledgment that a surgical system is
safe, deployment will not succeed. Regulatory requirements
act as barriers to progress. Within a suitable certification
framework, however, regulations become useful boundary
specifications and can orient and guide forward technical
development.
II. SAFETY PARADIGMS
The standard process in use consists of first designing
the system to meet its functional specification and then
implementing safety safeguards within the paradigm of
hazard assessment and risk mitigation. This is the logic
employed, for example, by the recent ISO safety certification
for assistive devices [5].
It may be necessary for system designers to also develop
new evaluation methods specific to the domain and task.
The process involves establishing quantitative safety bounds
for all relevant features (pressure, temperature, etc.) of the
physical human-robot interaction at each point of contact, for
example as done in [6]. Validating safety then means showing
that the machine operates within the bounds of the safety
region thus established. This approach holds at the physical
level and also at the logical level, whenever the safety region
can be interpreted as the set of nodes (states) which are not
connected to any nodes (states) known to represent an error
condition.
These new methods, initially pertaining only to the device
under development, can later be generalized to a class of
devices with the same purpose or working mechanism. The
resulting validation-and-testing toolbox eventually finds its
way into regulations and standards, and ultimately becomes,
years down the line, the basis for the work of certification
officers.
As far as the systemic aspects are concerned—especially
those intertwined with the fact that level 4 autonomous
surgical robots are in fact practicing medicine—methods
comprehensive enough to give rise to a standard have not
yet been developed. It can be foreseen that there will be a
substantial overlap with the way surgeons are licensed and
certified by a medical board.
Designing systems with safety in mind depends critically
on what is understood as a possible source of error. Each
source of error is then tracked with self-monitoring architec-
tures that detect deviations from expected functionality and
are capable of implementing recovery actions. This approach
has been pursued at all levels of abstraction, from hardware
components [7] to high-level situation-awareness [8]. The
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same supervisory role is played by the human under whose
responsibility assistive surgical systems currently operate.
What does it mean to demonstrate safety in robots that by
design do not operate in a controlled environment, do not rely
on repetition, cannot constrain the range of human behaviors,
and whose tasks are entirely context-dependent? In these
circumstances, the systemic aspect of safety dominates and
the key sources of error have to do with system integration
and the logical properties of the interaction. Existing safety
standards, on the other hand, mainly focus on a lower level of
abstraction, that of the physical properties of the interaction.
III. RESPONSIBLE HUMANS, SAFE SYSTEMS?
The problem of safety in machines that operate semi-
autonomously has been conflated with the issue of respon-
sibility, probably because assumption of responsibility is a
cornerstone element of legal thinking. Our approach clearly
distinguishes the two concepts of safety and responsibility.
In the current regulatory environment, decisions made
by the physician are by default acceptable, whereas the
decisions made by the machine need to be proven safe.
The disparity in the burden of proof is enormous: when
the decision is entrusted to the machine, we are required
not only to have the machine make the correct decision,
but to prove that it will do so within a certain margin of
risk. Methods to systematically evaluate the output are not
available, at times the acceptable error is several orders
of magnitude lower than what is afforded to humans, and
therefore the unintended consequence of current regulations
is to incentivize “offsetting to the human” in circumstances
in which it is not a natural choice. As a result, the design
problem itself is changed in artificial ways, taking the focus
away from the development of needed enabling technology.
Often the human does not have access to better clinical
information than the machine does and cannot double-check
in meaningful ways. Users end up trusting the machine
output that they are meant to oversee.
We interpret the human component in systems at au-
tonomy levels 0-4 as needed scaffolding in the process
of development and deployment of a level 5 device. The
human’s role is not to take responsibility for operation, but
to:
1) fill in wherever the robot is not yet up to par with hu-
man performance, until the robot reaches that standard
and can implement its own control,
2) serve as an embodied high-level monitoring architec-
ture, and
3) provide a fail-over, an alternative mode of operation
(e.g. laparoscopic or open surgery) that is well un-
derstood and that one can revert to in case of critical
system failure.
Whereas the first is a functional role, the supervisory and
fail-over elements are intrinsically safety features.
Rather than naively assuming that effective human su-
pervision just happens, we hold that this supervisory role
needs to be carefully designed, especially at higher levels
of autonomy. Monitoring processes are tasked with continu-
ously comparing expected output to actual output, for the
entire duration of the procedure. In the case of surgery,
procedures can last hours. Humans cannot sustain the level
of attentiveness required of a monitoring process for such
extended amounts of time, unless they are actively interacting
with the monitored process. In surgical robots at autonomy
level 3, the physician merely approves the robot’s proposed
plan of action, or chooses from a set of proposed alternatives,
leaving the execution entirely in the robot’s hands. At level 4
the human’s contribution is purely supervisory. In both cases,
for the greatest majority of the time the human is passively
observing and runs the risk of incurring in attention fatigue
and habituation.
System design needs to take into account the critical
constraint of limited attention, and ask humans to supervise
in the way they can do it best: discontinuously, paying
attention at point of interaction in response to a relational
prompt. Instead of relying on the hope of continuous hu-
man supervision, autonomous surgical robots realistically
need adequate self-monitoring architectures that communi-
cate through interrupts by raising flags and directing attention
on specific situations. This also requires the machine to be
able to notice that something is going awry. Knowing what
is going awry requires very sophisticated thinking, but it is
already possible for machines in the early stages of autonomy
to notice that something is potentially going awry.
Semi-autonomous surgical systems must manage the flow
of information and raise relevant safety-critical information
in a way that primes the human to check using his/her own
native perception and thought processes. When prompted
and alerted to contextual information to integrate, humans
provide a valuable additional level of safety via redundancy
through diversity.
An additional benefit of this self-monitoring and com-
munication style is providing the evidentiary record needed
to resolve a case in court, an audit log. It is impossible
to substantiate a claim of harm without having access to
precisely the data that would need to be monitored intra-
operatively to ensure safe decision-making.
IV. AT THE INTERFACE
The boundary between what is controlled by the human
and what by the machine is in all cases the critical element.
In level 0 systems the human is so deeply in the loop that
the machine’s decision-making is reduced to choosing how
to best translate the user input into motion, for example by
performing tremor suppression. As autonomy increases, the
human is less deeply in the loop and the jurisdiction of the
machine grows.
Learning to drive offers a good model: there is another
set of controls in the same car and an instructor is ready
to take over until the apprentice is sufficiently trained to
earn a driver’s license. We believe that joint control is an
inescapable and fundamental element on the way to fully
autonomous systems. Once the technology reaches level 5,
the human interacts with the robot as an “outside” (collabo-
rative) agent. Conceptually, the interface has moved and now
separates distinct agents, instead of distinct subsystems in a
joint control architecture.
Even though the interface moves, its properties should not
change. At level 5, where humans are interacting collabo-
ratively with robots, the key property is interpretability. We
propose that this property must hold at all locations, and that
preserving interpretability is a fundamental design constraint
for safety-critical robots at all levels of autonomy.
V. BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND YOU
Monitoring architectures and hazard analysis address the
how of safety; in the context of surgical robots, at all levels of
autonomy, the what of safety is decision-making. We propose
that a safety-driven design process for autonomous machines
be viewed in terms of the controlled and progressive transfer
of decision-making from human to machine and that the
safety certification process be viewed as certifying the pro-
cess of decision-making, made transparent to the user (the
intervening physician or the medical team) though semantic
interfaces.
The careful design of such interfaces, possibly specified
in the form of assume-guarantee contracts, allows tracing
errors and undesirable outcomes to a specific agent behavior.
The issue of responsibility is addressed by separating the
user’s operational responsibility—to behave in accordance
with the semantics of the interface—and the responsibility
for the system, shared by the developers and certification
officers.
Whenever a specific area of decision-making has been
placed on the machine side of the interface, the user should
not be expected to take responsibility for the machine’s
decision-making in that area or intervene to correct it, unless
it violates the semantic of the interface. The user often does
not have access to the data necessary to assess the quality of
the choice and should not be burdened with an impossible
task. The detectable, behavioral violation of a contract is the
trigger for corrective action.
To guarantee that smooth functional interaction between
user and machine can occur, the design process needs to be
structured and constrained in very significant ways from the
start: the critical need is to limit what is visible to the user
to what can be accomplished with interpretable tools. The
most significant limitation is in the use of artificial neural
networks (ANNs), with explainable decision making in the
flavor of “explainable AI.” Two main classes of approaches
exist, according to [9]:
1) creating an apparatus to interrogate a black box and
derive some of its properties or some properties of its
output (post-hoc interpretability, e.g. in [10])
2) encapsulating a white box and restricting ANNs to
using only interpretable primitives to approximate
general functions (model-based interpretability, e.g. in
[11]).
We favor the second approach. There is room to use black-
box non-interpretable components as part of the scaffolding
in the development process.
A second design constraint is that context needs to be
organized and integrated systematically and the same con-
text ought to be accessible by all modules. Safety cannot
be “added” at the end by patching possible issues in the
robot/human interface; rather, it emerges from the logical
environment in which the system is immersed during devel-
opment, as a fruit of system-wide consistency. The practice
of going through a checklist of known sources of adverse
events is still necessary, but it is no longer the core locus of
safety.
The effort to preserve interpretability at all levels of the
system allows a natural implementation for a number of im-
portant safety features, which we contend form a foundation
for certifying the more abstract aspects of safety.
A safety certification process of the type we envision
includes verifying at least the following:
• the existence of a logically consistent hierarchy of
default behaviors, unambiguously determined by the
circumstances. It must be possible to know in advance
and with certainty to which behavior the robot will
default in any given error condition.
• Mechanisms to log the intra-operative data necessary to
derive correct recovery actions for rare and unexpected
(but foreseeable) events, precalculated recovery plans,
and algorithms to adjust such recovery plans intra-
operatively within an acceptable time lag.
• Model- and knowledge-based methods to independently
check the conclusions reached by the robot while using
data-driven methods.
• The design of comprehensive audit logs, to allow
forensic reconstruction of the decisions made during
a given surgical procedure and to confirm what was
communicated to the human user and when.
Validating the decision-making module and rendering pre-
dictable what the machine will do in any given set of
conditions is the lion’s share of the work. The requirement
that all relevant information be available at the point of
decision completes the picture of safety certification: given
sufficient information to choose a good course of action, the
robot indeed does so.
VI. CONCLUSION
One cannot guarantee safety in a system in which it is not
known how to precisely assign responsibility for violations
detected (or anticipated) during development. Because a root
cause can have a multiplicity of consequences, often related
to each other in obscure ways, the inability to trace the error
to its decision-level origin introduces logical inconsistencies
at the system level. They, in turn, can originate hard-to-see
systemic errors and render the system unsafe.
On the other hand, when decisional causality can be made
clear, responsibilities can be identified and corrective actions
taken, through redesign or even during operation. In these
circumstances, corrective actions are actual solutions, and
not merely compensations for some of the effects introduced
by an error upstream. This can be achieved by preserving
interpretability at all levels of the system, and by designing
the flow of information between robot and user already
within the paradigm of assume/guarantee contracts.
Certifying decision-making is a very big challenge. It
will require innovation in key areas, because decision-
making depends critically on both knowledge representa-
tion and context-awareness. Many things come together at
this nexus, many distinct problems that require a unified
approach because they are fundamentally aspects of the
same problem: integrating ever-expanding knowledge from
evidence-based medicine, developing autonomous surgical
robots, reconciling data-driven and model-driven approaches,
making decision-making explainable.
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